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Il’f and Petrov
The ﬁremen decided that the most effective way to put
down the ﬁre was by total conﬂagration.
Lenta.ru, December 23, 2006
The Soviet absorption of Central Asia in the 1920s fol-
lowed the usual path of modern colonization, i.e. military
intervention and subsequent Cultural Revolution which
strived to rapidly transform a “backward people” into
“civilized citizens” by changing their traditions and altering
their nature (Khalid, 2006). The success of such a conquest
required control over the conquered territories by estab-
lishing law and order. By the 1920s, the Red Army was
winning battles over the Central Asia which included terri-
tories of Turkistan, Bukhoro and Semirechie. Soviet hopes
the immediate “victory” of the socialist system in Central
Asia was however shattered. The demise of the traditional
hierarchical system did not automatically lead to the
establishment of modern and secular republics. Instead
what followedwas a decade of insurgency, lawlessness, andResearch Center, HanyangUniverscorruption. The following article analyses some of these
trends based on the research of the Red East Soviet archives.
The revolution and civil war succeeded in eliminated
the existing power structure, but did not change traditional
political culture, centuries-old economic ties, societal atti-
tudes, systems of beliefs, or symbols of hierarchy and
prestige. The “locals” of the “Eastern territories” did not
take well to the new system. They resisted social and
cultural transformation and congregated to familiar
patrons and Muslim authorities. In the absence of viable
alternatives, many continued to resolve their problems
through clan networks based on the patronage system.1
Soviet power in its turn lacked the economic resources,
equipment, military personnel, and the trained and
educated professionals required for the reconstruction of
disintegrated societies.
This power vacuum as rapidly ﬁlled with power-hungry
adventurers, remaining elites, and the previously-dispos-
sessed, who used and abused the situation for their
personal gain. Many newly-appointed Soviet and Party
ofﬁcialsdincluding from both locals and outsidersdwere
tempted by stunning opportunities to enrich themselves.
This region situated at the trade crossroads of the centu-
ries-old Silk Road, so wonderfully afﬂuent in its resources,
lay open in front of them like the land of treasures from the
Arabian tales. And chaos without accountability provided
perfect opportunities for the abuse of power, corruption,1 Khalid, 233.
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content had little to do with socialist ideas.
It became painfully clear that communist ideology was
often used by “accidental revolutionaries”, as an excuse for
the acquisition of personal power and proﬁt. One Party
ofﬁcial writes: “Many joined us and followed communism
only because they smelled proﬁt for themselves. As soon as
it became less lucrative, they turned away from our
communist slogans and followed something else”.2 From
the perspective of the common people, the new system did
not bring welcome relief, but rather added hardships. One
Bolshevik ofﬁcial commented: “The storm of theft, fraud,
and corruption engulfed even those few responsible people
who attempted to ﬁght against it. TheMuslim poor had just
started to understand the meaning of Soviet power. They
had enormous difﬁculties because they saw all communists
as fortune-hunters, no different from former tsarist ofﬁcials
and kulaks. Local landowners merged with insurgents and
instigated a state of feudal anarchy, thus diffusing Soviet
power. It is obvious that there never had been Soviet power,
only the rule of thieves”.3 Other observers remarked that
little had changed after the revolution of 1917: “The new
life is the same as the old life. In the old days, the common
people had no power since it was in the hand of bour-
geoisie. And now it is the same: The new elites do not care
for the common people”.4
In 1920, alarmed by the deteriorating situation, Soviet
authorities sent in the “Red East,” a propaganda train. The
ofﬁcials onboard were to assess the state of Central Asian
affairs, as well as to deliver lectures and literature, and to
give theatrical performances for the “liberated.” “The Red
East” visited Samarqand, Farghona, Andijon, and the Syr-
Darya region, as well as many areas of Semirechie; alto-
gether, some 20 cities, 12 settlements, 95 villages, and 49
subdivisions. According to the records, the train delivered
65 lectures with a total audience of 10,000 people, and
organized 327 public meetings with a total audience of
197,000 people. The train journey took months and lasted
until the end of 1921.5
The trip through deserts and steppes was expected to be
peaceful, so there initially were few armed men aboard.
Soon, however, the trip turned into a full-blown investiga-
tion on wheels. Overwhelmed by an avalanche of breaches
of law and order, train authorities called for reinforcements.
The ﬁrst to arrive were investigators, who inspected 49
regions and 95 villages, and accepted 785 complaints. Just
under half of those (365) were resolved on the spot,6 while
the rest were sent to Revolutionary tribunals and courts for
further investigation and/or prosecution.
The complaints illuminated numerous wide-ranging
problems. One pressing issue was the organized resistance
of the local populations. The “insurgents” formed
bandsdvarying in size from twenty to eight hundred2 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 1252, op. 1, d.
147 (1), 50.
3 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 153(2), 7.
4 Ibid, d. 196 (3), 7.
5 Ibid, d.192, p. 2.
6 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 153, 327.membersdwhich were engaged in arms sales, militant
conspiracies, provocations against the Red Army, anti-
Soviet attacks, and robberies of stores and trains.7 Some
“insurgents” kidnapped Soviet ofﬁcials and cut off their
heads, threatened to kill family members of collaborators,
and prevented local people from joining the ranks of the
Bolshevik party. Insurgent activity was widespread in Far-
ghona, Namandan, Khodjand, Khoqand, and Andijon and
was often supported by the religious leaders or mullahs,
who were against any foreign and Godless presence.8 An
ofﬁcial report stated that the activities of the gangs pre-
sented a “real threat to the newly-established regime and
jeopardized recruitment of the local militia trainees”.9
Equally disappointing were increasing accounts of
“terrorist” activities linked to Party and Soviet ofﬁcials. On
one occasion, a gang numbering twenty one people was
arrested in Samarqand, along with the chairman of the
regional ChK.10 Chairman Khomdanov protected criminal
elements and even released some from jail11, according to
witness statements. In another case, Comrade Tuvaga from
the Farghona city government proclaimed himself
a “protector of the proletariat” but, in reality, he was the
leader of a gang. Comrade Madolin, a member of local
Farghona militia, also fought the Soviets in his spare time.
Madolin was not a Muslim or even a local resident, yet
a statement he made at his trial became a motto for many
locals: “Just you wait”, he said. “We are only loyal to the
Russians until they help us to get back on our feet. Thenwe
will take matters in our own hands and spit on all
Russians”.12 While it is unclear to what degree such reports
were exaggerated, the situation became increasingly
unstable.
Such chaos made it virtually impossible to distinguish
between friend and foe. People displayed their loyalty one
day and switched sides the next. Most were following their
own agenda. When confronted, they covered up for each
other, and often deceived all sides. The infamous Farghona
valley bandit Bayan and his gang once held a celebration in
a village. When the authorities arrived, all except proud
Bayan ran away. He was arrested with six bloody knives in
his possession. Two days later, however, one of the militia
members released Bayan, claiming that Bayan’s behavior
was “nothing more than normal partying with his
brothers”.13 Observers remarked that it was impossible to
tell where “militia ended and the banditry began”. One
such witness writes in desperation: “For the residents of
the cities life is full of danger. In the city of Samarqand it is
unsafe to walk the streets or to stay at home. Every day
there is ﬁghting on the streets and no militia in sight. The
chairman of militia is the bandit himself”.148 Ibid, d. 159, 46.
9 Ibid, 52.
10 ChK-Chrezvychainaia Kommissiia po bor’be s ugolovnoi aktivnosty, the
All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution
and Sabotage (Cheka) established 1917.
11 Ibid, d. 142 (2), 134.
12 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 160 (1).
13 Ibid, d. 143(2), 20.
14 Ibid, d. 143 (3), 10.
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authorities. Yet the army contingent was small and local
Bolshevik authorities had neither the revenue nor the
trained personnel to stop criminal activities. Both the cities
and the rural areas were under-governed: For instance,
there were only 100 militia members in the one city
populated by 8000 people. The salary of militia members
was 800 rubles a month, plus a small food ration which
included meat, barley, and butter.15 Militia members also
worked without free days or vacations. The head of the ChK
of the city of Shymkent admits: “The local militia is
powerless. They are poorly funded, poorly dressed and
supplied, and have no way of protecting the population”.16
Another member of the militia writes in desperation:
“There is an overwhelming sense of moral decay, no
motivation to work. We have no boots, no revolvers; there
are only 20 horses; 80 people have to walk. There are no
specialists and no one knows how to conduct searches. We
are swamped with paperwork”.17
It is no wonder that some local militia members turned
to illegal activities to supplement their small salaries and
limited authority. Border patrolmen were implicated in
armed robberies and illegal conﬁscations of food, wine,
rugs, pillows, and blankets. Others were engaged in rack-
eteering, hooliganism, inappropriate disruptions of reli-
gious holidays, attempted murder, falsiﬁcation of reports,
and beatings of civilians.18 There were also alarming
reports of the torture of prisoners. Kozial, once a director of
the division of the Internal Affairs, was accused of partic-
ularly cruel behavior. He undressed detainees, squeezed
their necks, burned their noses with cigarettes; and set
their genitals on ﬁre with candle ﬂames.19 Another report
revealed some cases of torture by salted herring during
which prisoners were deprived of water for days a time.20
Even when guided by good intentions, the military and
militias wrought havoc due to a lack of proper training and/
or clear instructions. For example, an urgent request for
assistance was sent from the border patrol in Bukhoro to
the central authorities in Moscow: “We have no idea what
is supposed to be conﬁscated and what is not. What counts
as a contraband and what does not? The Bukhoro boarder
patrol operates in the dark, it conﬁscates everything people
bring to Customs, which causes complaints from local
populations, and we have no way to resolve it since we
have no one in charge and no one gives us orders”.21 The
reply came shortly with an order to compile a list of
conﬁscated goods. The custom ofﬁcers listed 41,100 rubles
in currency and various goods totaling 4,740,806 rubles:
Tons of wheat, raisins, nuts, rice, dried fruits, soap,
galoshes, needles, silk, paint, doors, mint, linens, pants,
scarves, robes, bags, yurts, 2 bulls, 62 camels, 13 donkeys, 615 The pound of bread cost 100–120 rubles, a pile of wood-5000 rubles,
a pair of boots-10,000 rubles; an ofﬁcial’s salaryd6500 a month (GARF, f.
1252, op. 1, d. 196 (1), 146)..
16 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 146 (1), 9.
17 Ibid, d. 146 (1), 12.
18 Ibid, d. 140 (3), 91.
19 Ibid, 103.
20 Ibid, d. 143 (3), 147.
21 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 140 (2), 42.horses, 528 sheep. After brief contemplation, the central
authorities ordered the local patrolmen to donate all the
conﬁscated goods to Soviet organizations and orphanages.
The customs ofﬁcials replied immediately: “All donated. 76
ropes remain.” There is no record of what happened to the
currency or ropes.22
The “Red East” train investigators came to the conclu-
sion that corruption, fraud, embezzlement, bribery, forgery,
and debauchery among the members of the local Soviet
organizations, ChK, and the Special political divisions
everywhere in the regionwere rampant.23 It was noted that
the chairmen of the local ChK and regional executive
committees assisted criminals and accepted bribes24; and
chairmen of various chancelleries,25 ofﬁcials of the regional
provisional committees, and the secretaries of labor
departments embezzled money, forged annual reports, and
sold illegal alcohol.
Children and the elderly and sick were particularly
vulnerable to becoming victims of such bezpredel (total
disorder). The director of one orphanage used its funds for
his own personal needs.26 Medical personnel sometimes
refused to provide assistance to locals without bribes, and
ofﬁcials in charge of search and seizure assaulted elderly
people during raids, and illegally conﬁscated property and
money without reporting it. Others wrote false denuncia-
tions, hired criminals,27 illegally taxed locals, conﬁscated
horses and their provisions, threatened people with arrest,
and assaulted those who refused to obey.28 There were
alarming reports of burglaries of the medical trains and the
sale of linens contaminated with chicken pox.29 A director
of water supply conﬁscated private gardens and returned
them to the former owners in exchange for 2000 rubles. 30
His ﬁle includes a report from one of the investigators, who
laments: “There is no open counter-revolution but instead
an avalanche of petty crimes. I felt sorry for the poor local
natives who stoically withstand another disaster (i.e. Soviet
presence)”.31
Confronted with this avalanche of abuses, the train
investigators were forced to initiate further inspections of
local institutions, ofﬁces, factories, schools, orphanages,
and sanatoriums. The inspection of the Shymkent sanato-
rium for tuberculosis patients revealed a horrible picture.
Mushtaev, the director of the sanatoriumwhowas a former
telegraph ofﬁcial, was incapable of meeting his responsi-
bilities, though he had the best intentions. There were
shortages of kumis (a drink made out of horse’s milk),
which was the main treatment for the patients, many of
whom were seriously ill. The food was of poor quality and
there were no medications. Patients were placed in yurts
(nomadic huts) and slept on the ground. There was no22 Ibid, d. 140 (2), 62.
23 Ibid, d. 140 (3), 85.
24 Ibid, 12.
25 Ibid, d. 147 (4), 190–192.
26 Ibid, 192.
27 Ibid, d. 148, 25.
28 Ibid, d. 148, 27.
29 Ibid, d. 140 (3), 48.
30 Ibid, d. 145 (1).
31 Ibid, 11.
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investigator concluded: “The ﬁrst Soviet tuberculosis
sanatorium is a total failure”.32
The inspection of the local orphanage was equally dis-
turbing. Therewere nomattresses and children slept on the
bunk beds without blankets. They had no shoes and no
spare clothing, thus they were forced to go naked on
laundry days. Everything had been stolen and the director
was accused of embezzlement.33 The investigation of the
local Muslim school brought even more appalling ﬁndings:
“Teachers refused to work, they ate students’ food, called
students “donkeys,” embezzled money, and stole furniture.
The students’ riots were brutally suppressed. The director
used funds for orphans and bought a horse which cost
500,000, a gold watch which cost 110,000 and a dining set
which cost 300,000 rubles. He also stole and sold all the
Vienna chairs that belonged to the orphanage. Children are
constantly drunk, have sex with teachers, and are engaged
in prostitution”. An investigator saw nothing but “moral
and physical decay” and concluded that the religious school
was “a jail house”.34
The investigators concluded that the entire regional
system was in chaos. Many ofﬁcials had no shame while
pocketing proﬁts from the sale of national resources. An
investigation revealed that the former chairman of the
revolutionary committee, a chairman of the department of
supplies Kuydin, the chairman of the military factory
Kamesnkiy, the chairman of the export-import department
Saltanyantz, and the merchant Abramov systematically
stole Soviet goods and sold them to the neighboring
countries. In another case in the city of Khoqand, the
investigation uncovered illegal sales of stolen diamonds.35
There were reports of the sales of oil to foreigners in Syr-
Darya.36 Still other cases showed a devastating picture of
the “once-ﬂourishing cotton industry of the Farghona
region that was in ruins”.37
Soviet control committees worked day and night and
learned that ﬁsh and egg supplies were left to rot at a loss of
millions, that reserves of smoked ﬁsh were stolen, that
there was no control over cattle diseases; that most meat
suppliers did not fulﬁll their obligations yet were hand-
somely paid; that all the books from libraries miraculously
disappeared; that local vineyards were abandoned; and
that there was no protection of cotton and oil production.38
Overall, the investigation exposed the embezzlement of
millions of rubles.
In the absence of vigilant and constant control, many
members of the local party, and ChK and Soviet organiza-
tions, cleverly utilized their positions to beneﬁt themselves.
Poor accountability on the one hand and the riches of the
region on the other created a perfect recipe for corruption.
Numerous opportunities reinforced competition among32 Ibid, d. 147(2), 192.
33 Ibid, d. 158 (2), 8.
34 Ibid, d. 144 (1).
35 Ibid, d. 159, 44.
36 Ibid, d. 147 (1), 122.
37 Ibid, d. 140 (3), 48.
38 Ibid, d. 140 (2), 157.various groups for political and economic power, which
guaranteed free access to goods and resources. One report
keenly assessed the situation: “The fortune-hunters are
swarming around the Commissariats like bees; they
append themselves to it like parasites and eat it alive. Every
ofﬁcial thinks it is his duty to join the organization, steal,
cover his tracks, and then disappear so that others have
a chance to replace him at the feeder”.39
The struggle for spoils between the local ChK and the
Special division of Internal Affairs turned into “mortal
combat” that had little to do with ideological disagree-
ments.40 In their struggle for power and resources, both
departments employed all means. In one case, Iseev, an
ofﬁcial of the Special division of Internal Affairs and
a former chairman of the investigative division of the Katta-
Kurghan ChK, compiled lists of secret ChK agents and
copied and released them to insurgents. He also leaked
details about Soviet covert operations to potential enemies.
Members of the ChK, in their turn, accused the Special
division of Internal Affairs of fraud and falsiﬁcations.
In addition, ofﬁcials used their positions to pursue
personal vendettas. In one case, Stepanov, who was in
charge of the personnel ﬁles of the Katta-Kurghan Special
division, falsely accused his colleague Lialin of treason
because of a personal conﬂict. As a result, Lialin was
arrested and kept in jail for one month. Dimitrik-Maliarik,
the investigator of the same department, gave permission
to arrest Lialin, yet later was himself incarcerated for fraud
and alcohol abuse.41 A witness summarizes the situation:
“ChK and Internal Affairs behave without accountability;
they believe they are above the law. What can we do? Our
central authorities are far away”.42
In their pursuit of power, many ofﬁcials recruited
criminal elements and created a protected circle of loyal
followers. Sipko, the former chairman of the Katta-Kurghan
regional ChK, was accused of cruel treatment of working
people, of being intoxicated in public, and of taking
bribes.43 He was subsequently charged with violence,
cruelty, and falsiﬁcation of election results.44 The chairman
of the Samarqand regional party committee, Kuper, pro-
tected Sipko and even hired a lawyer for his defense. Sipko
allegedly became ill and thus did not appear at a court
hearing. Kuper then bribed doctor Zadunaiskiy, who con-
ducted a medical examination of Sipko, and concluded that
Sipko had a “neurotic” disease fromwhich it would require
years to recover. As a result, Sipko escaped justice.45
Further investigation into the Sipko case revealed that
Kuper had assisted another criminal defendant, Bayan, and
helped him to escape from justicedbecause Bayan’s sister
was having an intimate relationship with a friend of Kup-
er’s. It was established that Bayan paid a great deal of
money for his release.46 As a result of this investigation39 Ibid, d. 152 (3), 148.
40 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 153 (3), 87.
41 Ibid, d. 196 (3), 7.
42 Ibid, d. 140, 5.
43 Ibid, d. 140(3), 43.
44 Ibid, d. 145 (2), 24.
45 Ibid, f. 1252, op. 1, d. 145(2), 27.
46 Ibid, d. 145(2), 11.
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tionary tribunal in Tashkent.47
Enraged and discouraged, central authorities continued
to push for the victory of the socialist system. But local
traditional economic, social, and cultural ties remained
very strong and presented a formidable impediment.
Instead of choosing a bright path towards a modern secular
republic, local populations continued to rely on uniquely
regional patterns of trade, patron–client relationships,
family ties, and class structures that ran contrary tomodern
notions of equality and fraternity.48
With the establishment of the Soviet representative
system of the local elections the patron–client networks
gained new meaning and purpose. The elections were seen
by many as a method to reinstall local elites to positions of
power. Votes were often bought with camels and horses.49
Fraudulent elections became the norm. One witness notes:
“The sons of former landowners previously involved in
murder, arson, and women-kidnapping are now in charge
of the revolutionary committees and behave like tsars and
gods. These gangs of pretty boys only drink and misbehave
badly”.50 In some cases, the process was ignored altogether
and people were appointed, not elected.51 A report from
the city of Andijon describes one case among many.52
Dozens of signatures in Arabic claimed that “director of
the village commune, Chevilov, was a predator who
appointed rich but incompetent people under the
patronage of his friend, Khalbatyrov, the chairman of the
local revolutionary committee”.53
Many local residents hesitated to seek justice through
the Soviet system and resorted to bribes, which was an
overwhelming phenomenon that was especially difﬁcult to
combat. An investigator writes: “The native population is
used to the system of bribes and accepts it as the natural
order of things. The natives, divided into groups, at the time
of the elections vote for their local representatives only
(because of their ignorance of the system). Some hoped
that their native ofﬁcial will be on their side and will mend
laws solely in the interest of their group. After such an
ofﬁcial is elected or appointed, the opposing group writes
denunciations or complains about the results of the elec-
tions. Such denunciations are often exaggerated or falsify
facts, which make it difﬁcult to investigate. People also use
false witnesses. There are many tea rooms (chaikhana)
where so-called professional witnesses gather, drink tea,
and patiently waited for their turn to be hired”.54
In some cases entire families, including their friends,
clients, and patrons, i.e. “the circle,” became the target of
thorough investigations. The case of Sultanbek Takhtan-
bekov, from the city of Andijon, was particularly informa-
tive. Sultanbek Takhtanbekov joined the Bolshevik party
during World War I. After 1917, was appointed the47 Ibid.
48 Ibid, d. 145 (2), 13.
49 Ibid, 27.
50 Ibid, d. 140 (3), 145–146.
51 Ibid,13.
52 Ibid, 18.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, 149.chairman of the revolutionary committee of the city of
Andijon. Soon enough Sultanbek was accused of bribes.55
A scrupulous investigation showed that Sultanbek sent
his minions to Tashkent to sell stolen goods at the market.
His loyalists bought wagons of wheat that belonged to the
community and then resold them, taking 25 pounds from
each transaction as proﬁt, and they did the samewith cattle
and butter. Sultanbek had a brother, Uslambek, who was
also implicated in various misdeeds. There were numerous
reports that Uslambek kidnapped two wives from their
husbands and impoverished the families, taking the wives’
shares of the household.56
The investigators found that another relative of the
brothers, Muminbaev, was the chairman of the local
butchers committee. With him, they concocted a successful
scheme to undercut their competition. Muminbaev, known
and respected as a “patron of all people” went to Soviet
authorities and offered them a proposal. He would borrow
three million rubles to purchase lambs and then sell the
meat to the people twenty rubles cheaper than the rest of
the butchers. The chairman of the revolutionary committee,
Baryshev, issued a license toMuminbaev to sell themeat. He
also gave him a mandate for the transaction and 50 million
rubles. Muminbaev then purchased lambs for 40 million
rubles and shared his proﬁt with the parties involved.57
The case of Takhtambekov went farther. Numerous
witnesses testiﬁed that Takhtambekov and Co. interfered
with the electoral process and threatened any opposition to
their loyalists. Khusanbekov, a Party member since 1918,
testiﬁed that at the Party conference one of the candidates
for reelection, Pardzhiev, was accused of fraud and
removed from the list. Pardzhiev had had some informa-
tion that would be detrimental to the reputation of Takh-
tambekov and his people. Thus, Takhtambekov used a pre-
emptive strike to remove Pardzhiev before he could present
his accusations at the Party conference.58 Another witness,
Urazaliev, a Party member since 1918, conﬁrmed that
Takhtambekov had seized his horse and sent it as a gift to
the chairman of the party committee in Tashkent in order
to insure that Pardzhiev was jailed and case was closed.59
Many witnesses testiﬁed to Takhtambekov’s long crim-
inal history. One witness, Sarkirov, testiﬁed that he once
went to the neighboring house to borrow a meat grinder.
There he sawmany familiar Party ofﬁcials who played cards
for money. One of the players was Sultanbek Takhtambe-
kov. While the gambling was a traditional male leisure
activity for Muslim communities, gambling was considered
a violation of Party discipline. The investigators suspected
that the private gambling houses served as a breeding
ground for conspiratorial activities against the Soviets. It
was discovered that the patrons of the gambling houses
gathered to discuss illegal business transactions. They sold
and traded merchandise as well as gold and silver. Taking
advantage of privileged information, they compiled lists of55 Ibid, d. 150, 12.
56 Ibid, d. 146 (2), 128.
57 Ibid, d. 146 (2), 177.
58 Ibid, 173.
59 Ibid, 174.
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arrest while extorting tributes. They once captured Chinese
merchants along the border and conﬁscated goods totaling
twenty-eight million rubles. Ironically, the conﬁscated
merchandise was later uncovered hidden in the basement
of the local court house.60
Takhtambekov and Co. disobeyed the authorities and
openly demonstrated their total disregard for Soviet power.
One ChKmember recollectedwith disgust:” I was present at
one of their parties. All of the ofﬁcials were drinking grape
vodka. They got drunk and started to tell jokes about the
workers-communists. I asked them: “Aren’t you the
workers?” They said: “No. We are the proletariat”. I said:
“You are not the proletariat; you aremarauderswho devour
the body of the proletariat like a ﬂock of black ravens”.61 As
a result of the investigation, the cases of Takhtambekov,
Shamursinov, Sadybekov, Umarbaev, and othersdtwenty
people altogetherdwere sent to the Revolutionary
Tribunal. They faced charges of embezzlement, fraud, abuse
of power, counter-revolution, and treason.
The investigations were slowed down by the reluctance
of locals, particularly the poor, to come forward with infor-
mation about their abusers. Their fear of retaliationwas not
unfounded. It was indeed unsafe to complain and report
injustices. Prior to the arrival of the “Red Train”, local
authorities were commonly released from jail even if their
crimes were conﬁrmed. In one case, the chairman of the
censorship department, Goloborod’ko, was charged with
theft and detained. He was later released and appointed to
the Special political department. In another case, Molari-
Dmirik, a military investigator who was previously director
of the provisional department, was changed with theft and
alcohol abuse. He then began his own investigation of Party
members and jailed several witnesses in his own case. One
reports noted: “No wonder the local population refuses to
cooperate with Soviet power. They know what happens to
thosewhocomplain. Forexample, a local female teacherwas
arrested as a saboteurwhen she openly spoke against sexual
assault and injustices”.62
The chairman of the Katta-Kurghan regional ChK agreed:
“The bandits under the mask of communism occupy posi-
tions of power and use their positions for personal purposes.
The so-called Soviet administration is nothingmore than the
bandits themselves. They expropriate property and when
caught move from one position of power to another. Where
is justice? An ofﬁcial was arrested after some locals brought
charges against him, but the next day they saw that him
walking the streets freely. What kind of horror must they
have felt? Poor Muslims have no trust in Soviet power. They
would rather give up all of their possessions than seek
justice from Soviet authority”.63
The deteriorating situation began to change the social,
cultural, and spiritual ties within these traditional commu-
nities. Many religions restrictions previously imposed by
Muslim authorities were ignored, along with the new60 Ibid, 188–190.
61 Ibid, 177.
62 Ibid, d. 140 (3), 10.
63 Ibid, 7.Bolshevik orders. There were innumerable cases of alcohol
abuse, which happened in predominantly Muslim areas.
Bothnon-Muslimoutsidersand localMuslimswere engaged
in the production, sale, and consumption of moonshine
vodka, called kishmishovka (made out of kizhmish, a type of
grape) which was considered to be a serious offense64 by
both religious and secular authorities. Soviet authorities
argued angrily that heavy drinking was a disgrace and
a threat to the revolution.One inspector reported thatnoone
met him upon his arrival in Vanovsk. Both the chairman of
the regional revolutionary committee and his secretary,
apparently, were so drunk that they had passed out.65
Whilemany disregarded religious restrictions in respect to
alcohol, they still continued to obey the hierarchy of local
communities based on status and prestige. The new elite
replaced the old. The symbolic representation of status and
prestige continued to depend on the possessions of horses,
camels, and wives, as well as on elaborate and expensive
ritualistic celebrations of wedding and holidays. The only
availableﬁnancial sources for suchcelebrationswere theParty
fundswhichmanyofﬁcials treated as their ownpossessions.66
The New Year celebration in the city of Perovsk was one
example of such celebration: “The elites of the city cele-
brated the New Year. All the ofﬁcers wore golden uniforms
and all the rich people were wrapped in furs. They cooked
lamb and drank alcohol while the local population starved.
For entertainment they invited a singer who sung “God,
Save the Tsar!” They had clearly forgotten that the times
had changed dramatically. Offended local workers
attempted to stop the celebration. In response the elites
started to shoot at them with revolvers. The workers came
prepared, and responded with gun ﬁre as well. The cele-
bration was over and many were killed”.67
In another case, a wedding reception which cost three
million rubles was organized by the political commissar,
Shadyrov. Prior to this event, therewere already allegations
of embezzlement against Shadyrov. According towitnesses,
the wedding reception was attended by three hundred
people: local Party members, high ofﬁcials of the region,
heads of chancelleries, and chairmen of militia. After some
hours they started to sing arias from the opera “Demon” and
threatened “to punch everyone in the face” if interrupted.68
Alarmed ofﬁcials commented: “There are plenty of Party
generals who use the people’s money to drink and pay for
personal tailors. The Party committees organize banquets
with fountains of wines and liquors, invite capitalists, and
use public trains for their personal trips. Such behavior
causes enormous resentment and rage amidst working
people who are at the point of starvation. A member of the
local government, Bronde, and his pals traveled on the train
with luxury for days, engaged in alcoholic debauchery. The
entire Party organization protested against it. During one
orgy, the representative Bartashevich passed out on a pile of64 Ibid, 143(1), 165.
65 Ibid, d. 147 (3).
66 Ibid, d. 147 (3), 134.
67 The pound of bread cost 100–120 rubles, a pile of wood-5000 rubles,
a pair of boots-10000 rubles; an ofﬁcial’s salaryd6500 a month (GARF, f.
1252, op. 1, d. 196 (1), 146).
68 Ibid, f. 1251, op. 1 d. 146 (1,2,3), 65.
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attempted arrest hewoke up and yelled “Don’t you dare!”.69
Some Soviet ofﬁcials continued the practices of the
Russian imperial administration and supported discrimi-
nation against some ethnic groups.70 For instance, Danilov,
a guard of the Nizhne-Talas irrigational system, supplied
only Russian villages while others were denied access to
water. As a result, the crops in their ﬁelds withered. An
ofﬁcial described the situation: “There is a muted struggle
between different coalitions ﬁghting for power and status,
illuminated by colonial tendencies and class-based atti-
tudes. In every uezd, volost’ and aul (regional and communal
divisions), power is in the hands of people who do not have
the trust of the local population and who contribute to the
ethnic tensions and racial hatred. Some pretend not to
understand the meaning of the Soviet power and interpret
it according to the peculiarity of their locale”.71
Some Soviet ofﬁcials used the “divide and conquer” rule,
allowing one ethnic group to assert dominance over
another. Such attitudes fueled hatred and resentment. In
one case, a conﬂict erupted between local Muslims and
recently-arrived Armenian Christians that led to ethnic
violence.72 Although this case was investigated, nothing
was done to prevent further hostilities.73
Understandably, many local people sought protection
for their faith and livelihood and congregated to familiar
Muslim religious authorities. Many observers noticed that
mullahs cleverly used their inﬂuence to attract young
people. Under their roof, these young people were shel-
tered and received instructions in organized resistance.
This rapidly led to the rise of insurgency. One ofﬁcial wrote:
“It is our own fault that all Russians are seen as enemies of
the Muslims”.74
The demands to establish control over the state of
“unrest” and “chaos” in Central Asia escalated. With every
passing month the rhetoric of reports and newspapers’
editorials became increasingly militant. One such editorial
entitled “One more front!” claimed that Soviet and Party
organizations were full of accidental revolutionaries,
adventurers, blackmarketers, and former gendarmes: “Like
parasites they use their proﬁtable positions, take bribes,
spend millions of rubles of the people’s money for their
own pleasure, and rob local populations without remorse.
Russians, Muslims, former tsarist ofﬁcials, former
policemen, interpreters, and sometimes workers spoiled by
the local anarchy and lawlessness, are tied tightly up in
a disgusting knot. Even local ChKs, the institutions that
were supposed to ﬁght corruption and crime, are not free of
such elements. The activities of the insurgents under such
circumstances are out of control. Soviet power is drowning
under the tsunami of the criminals. Honest and loyal ofﬁ-
cials transferred from the center have no power. While the
republic is still ﬁghting at the Polish front there is also the69 Ibid.
70 Ibid, d. 142 (2), 165.
71 Ibid, d. 147 (1), 5.
72 Ibid, d. 147 (1), 69.
73 Ibid, d. 147 (3), 18.
74 Ibid, d. 147(2), 135.Turkestan front.We ﬁght Soviet criminals with no less force
than we ﬁght against the White army”.75
High hopes that Revolution would open peoples’ minds
and hearts to peace, tolerance, collegiality, and communal
work for the beneﬁt of the future republic did not materi-
alize. The Bolshevik state was losing its battle for Central
Asia. Frustrated local and central authorities called formore
investigations and severe punishments. Onemember of the
Turkestan ChK, the Chairman of the Regional ChK
committee, submitted his suggestions to the central
government on June 16, 1920. This letter was one of the
precursors of coming changes: “The system is not working.
The strong hand of the proletariat is needed to smash
corrupt Soviet barons and the Soviet pompadours. It is
essential to have informants in every village and every
settlement selected only from loyal comrades. There should
be a conspiratorial ﬂat in every provincial city and an
informant in every ofﬁce. There should be an inquiry into
the activities of ofﬁcials twice a week. There should be an
infusion of Party members into local militias and there
should be more ChK members in every locale. The militia
should be equated in status and power to that of the Red
Army. There should be a military regiment of 100 specially-
trained people attached to the ChK. The secret operation of
ChK should be overseen by a loyal and energetic person.
There should be at least ﬁve investigators in ChK. There
should be additional and permanent funds available for
ChK. There should be a guarantee from upper-level
authorities that the local ChK has immunity and special
powers”.76 Thus, the way to the purges was paved.
Soviet authorities were unrealistic in their expectations
to swiftly deconstruct the old oppressive system without
a viable alternative. The “Red Train” itself turned into
a metaphor for failure. The train was a modern contraption
which they hoped to use to connect modernity and tradi-
tion. Local populations however refused changes, lacked
belief in the Soviet system, and continued to be oppressed
and apathetic. Many saw chaos as an opportunity to get rich
or improve their social mobility.
It is not surprising that the intensiﬁcation of repression
was seen as the only possible solution to a deteriorating
situation. Ironically, the escalation of repression only
created deeper rifts between Soviet power and the local
populations. In the end, societal disintegration and violence
corrupted nearly everyone: While the outsiders had
betrayed their secular principles of justice and equality,
many local Muslims had forsaken the laws of Islam.Reference
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